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THE*GRADE CROSSING SPEED LIMIT STATUTE
In 1926 the Virginia General Assembly passed Senate Bill 104
pertaining to operation of vehicles on the state highways.' As
amended, it now appears in the Code as Section 46-254, which
reads in part as follows:
Except in cities and towns every person driving any
vehicle on a highway, on approaching a place where a
railway crosses such highway at grade, at which crossing
no railway gates are maintained and no flagman is
stationed and on duty at the time, shall bring his vehicle
to a speed not exceeding five miles per hour before pass-
ing over such crossing, at a distance of not less than fifty
feet from the nearest rail ...
The bill was introduced by Senators C. C. Vaughan, Jr. and
J. A. Lesner.' As originally drafted, it called for a complete stop by
motorists at all railway grade crossings. There were, of course,
exceptions, and they were noted in the bill. However, when it went
to the House of Delegates, the "complete stop" provision was ob-
jected to by the members of the House. A conference committee
was appointed to attempt to reach a suitable agreement, the end
result of which was the five-mile-per-hour requirement now in
force. The act in its original form did not apply to railway lines
on which purely local trains were operated. In 1934 the General
Assembly amended the statute to include local trains.' With the
exception of a few minor changes dealing with interpretation,
this act has remained the Virginia law on the subject since March
25, 1926.
In an effort to find out just how antiquated the law is, the
author checked fifteen other jurisdictions, including .all but one of
those adjacent to Virginia. The only states in this. group having
laws similar to Virginia's have repealed them. Arizona had a re-
quirement to slow to 15 miles per hour when the view was ob-
structed within 400 feet either way at a grade crossing, and to
slow to 25 miles per hour where'the view; was unobstructed.' In
1950, the state legislature repealed this law and replaced it with a
provision that "the driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with
the requirements of [safe driving practice], drive at an appropriate
1. Acts of Assembly 1926, p. 763.
2. virginia Senate Journal 1926. p. 99.5. A u embly 1934. p. 401.
4. Sec. 66-101, A.CA. 1939.
reduced speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or
railway grade crossing.. . ."' West Virginia had had essentially the
same law, but it was amended in 1951 to read essentially the same
as the present Arizona statute. Thus, of fifteen states checked, only
two at any time had laws like the Virginia law. At present seven
states, Arkansas,' Kentucky,' North Carolina,' Tennessee," Mis-
sissippi,' Alabama," and Colorado" have statutes that allow the
road-governing body of the state or other specified authority the
right to designate certain grade crossings as hazardous. At such
crossings, the motorist is required to come to a complete stop be-
fore proceeding acrqss the tracks. Violation of this provision con-
stitutes a misdemeanor and is punishable by fines varying gen-
erally from 10 to 50 dollars. The motorist, at all other crossings,
is required to drive at a speed which is appropriate in view of road
conditions at grade crossings. Massachusetts," Florida," South
Carolina," and New York" have similar statutes that require the
motorist, upon approaching a railroad crossing, to reduce the
speed of the vehicle to a reasonable and proper rate and proceed
cautiously. over the crossing. Illinois apparently has 'no statute
directed specifically at grade crossings where there is not a signal
or a flagman, but its general provision" seems to imply a require-
ment of reasonable speed under the circumstances. The State of
Louisiana goes further than other states checked and requires the
motorist to come to a complete stop at all crossings." An analysis
of the statutes mentioned reveals that probably the most prevalent
law is the one designating certain crossings as hazardous and re-
quiring a complete stop by motorists.
The following provision in Section 46-254 should be
particularly noted:
... and failure to comply with the provisions of this sec-'
tion on the part of the driver of the vehicle shall not be
considered contributory negligence in an action against
the railway company for damages to persons or property,
5. Sec. 6&157c, A.C.A. 1939 (Cem. Spp. 1952).
6. Code. 1939. 1.39 [Cum. Sapp.. 1953. 1721(333)].
7. Ark. Stats. (1947). 173-640.
8. KiS 189:560.
9. G.S. 20-143.
10. Williams TeaL Code 1934. 12683.
II. Section 8210, Miss. Code of 1942.
12. Ala Code 1940. Tit, 36, 147.
13. A c.16. 1223.
14. eeaLaws c. 90 115.
15. Sec. 317:22 P.S. 1949.
16. Section 46-363. Code of 1942 as amended.
17. McKinne's Consolidated Laws. Book 48. Sam ULk 33a.
18. I11. Rev. Stat. 1949. chap. 93. par. 146.
19. R.S. 1930. Sec. 32:243.
whether the same be injury to the person or property of
the driver or any other person...
In this connection, Virginia has another statute to the effect that
the contributory negligence of a motorist does not bar him from
recovery if he can prove that the railway company's employee
failed to sound the required signals.m He must also prove that the
failure to do this was the negligence that caused his injury." In
interpreting this latter statute, the court said in Southern Ry. Co.
v. Johnson,' "If the failure to give the signals in .any way contrib-
uted to the accident, then, however grossly negligent the travelqr
was, he is entitled.. .to recover,, subject to'mitigation of his dam-
ages in proportion to his negligence."" Interpretation such as this
certainly makes any defense on the part of the railroad companies
very difficult. The two statutes, Section 56-416 and Section 46-254
insofar as it applies to negligence, grant a great advantage to the
motorist, even when he is negligent. As a general rule, it is neg-
ligence per se to violate a statute, and several of those jurisdictions
checked specifically so stated. This principle makes it even less
understandable why there should be a statutory exception immuniz-
ing the motorist against the effects of his own negligence.
It should be remembered that t-e rules regarding crossings
grew up "when railroads were daring economic ventures, and when
pioneer morality not only insisted that every man look out for
himself, but when a traveler had some asurance that by looking
out for himself he could protect himself."" Today railroad revenues
have been reduced by the competition of motor transport and air-
lines. The railroads are finding it increasingly difficult to compete
with these other methods of transportation. The state should rec-
ognize that railroads can not spread the loss placed on them by
large recoveries, arising from crossing accidents, as well as they
could in past years. In adopting the view it now maintains on
negligence, by statute' and decision, ' Virginia has in effect
changed the parties' bargaining position just because one of them
is a railroad. This certainly is not consistent with sound legal
principles; the parties should be able to enter court and argue
their case on even terms. The doctrine of comparative negligence,
20. Virginia Code of 1950. §56-416.
21. Gregoy v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 142 Va. 750, 128 S.E. 272 (1925); Etheridge
v. Norfolk Southern L. Co.. 143 Va. 789. 129 S.E. 680 (1925).
22. 151 Va. 345, 146 S.. 363 (1928).
23. /. a- 354, 146 S.3, 363, 365.
24. 29 CoLLRev. 255. 275 (1929).
25. Virginit Code of 1950, §46-25,4.
26. 151 V. 45. 146 5.!. 363 (1928).
which Virginia has adopted in railway crossing accidents, has
not turned out the way that the General Assembly had hoped, and
the result has been that railroads are looked upon with disfavor by
juries. This has forced the judges to substitute their judgment for
that of the jury to insure a proper decision. '
While the risk at crossings will never be entirely eliminated
by a statute designed to prevent accidents, the statute should be
readily enforceable and reasonable, to go as far as possible in
protecting property and lives; but such a statute to be fair must not
change the strength of the parties' position just because one of
them is a railroad.
The five-mile-per-hour limit at crossings applies equally to
those crossings where the motorist has an unobstructed view for
hundreds of yards and those where the view is seriously obstructed.
It applies to those crossings with a heavy volume of traffic and
also to those on local lines seldom used. This statute possibly was
acceptable when enacted twenty-eight years ago. Automobiles and
trucks were much slower, and the roads in the state were fewer and
of inferior quality, being in many instances dirt-surfaced. Today,
with a speed limit of 55 miles per hour as compared with 35 miles
per hour in 1926" and with a greater number of vehicles using the
highway system, this law is far from appropriate.
It is a well-recognized legal maxim that "reason is the soul
of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so
does the law itself."" It is submitted that the General Assembly
should adopt a law similar to the one presently in force in those
states which require the motorist to stop at designated hazardous
crossings and permit him to drive at an appropriate speed at all
others. The requirement of a full stop lends itself readily to en-
forcement, as does the command of stop signs placed at highway
intersections. In any event, the General Assembly should either
enact a more modern law with regard to crossings or at least strike
from the Code a statute which apparently is not enforced in a
criminal action" and has an unjustified effect on civil actions.
It is suggested that a statute such as the following be enacted,
to replace at least so much of Section 46-254 as applies to the five-
mile-per-hour limit for :automobiles:
27. For a more detailed analysis of this problem see 5 Wash.&Lee LRev. 147 (1948).
28. Virginia Code of 1926, §2145 (4).
29. Broom. Legal Maxims, p. 123 (6th ed. 1868).
30. See Virginia Code of 1950, 946-18.
When vehicles to slow down or stop at railway cross-
ings.-The road-governing body, whether State or
county, is hereby authorized to designate particularly
dangerous highway grade crossings of railroads at which
vehicles are required to stop, and to erect stop signs
thereat. When such stop signs -are erected, the driver of
every vehicle shall stop within fifty feet, but not less than
ten feet, from the nearest rail of such grade crossing and
shall proceed, with due care, only after ascertaining that
it is safe to do so.
And every person shall stop at such crossing where
gates are maintained when such gates are closed down,
or being lowered, and where a flagman is stationed and
on duty at the time, whenever signalled, by such flagman,
to stop.
At any other grade crossing not designated as par-
ticularly dangerous, the driver of any motor vehicle shall
drive at that speed which is reasonable and prudent under
the conditions then and there existing.
.Any person violating the provisions of this statute
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of
Section 46-18.
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